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Abstract
The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements 
containing expressions such as “… is true” and “it is true that …”? We claim 
that these expressions are generally not used in order to assign a certain property 
to sentences. We indicate that a predicative interpretation of these expressions 
was rejected by Frege and adherents to the prosentential conception of truth. 
We treat these expressions as operators. The main advantage of our operational 
reading is the fact that it adequately represents how the words “true” and “truth” 
function in everyday speech. Our approach confirms the intuition that so-called 
T-equivalences are not contingent truths, and explains why they seem to be—in 
some sense—necessary sentences. Moreover, our operational reading of truth 
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expressions dissolves problems arising from the belief that there is some specific 
property—truth. The fact that we reject that truth is a certain property does 
not mean that we deny that the concept of truth plays a very important role 
in our language, and hence in our life. We indicate that the concept of truth is 
inseparable from the concept of sentence and vice versa—it is impossible to 
explicate one of these concepts without appeal to the other. 
Keywords: truth, operator, predicate, logical form, Frege, Wittgenstein, Tarski
I
The question of truth causes many conflicts, even wars. Philosophy, in 
general, is not an exception to this rule. The difference is that philosophical 
struggles are wars of words. The majority of philosophers, however, 
agree on one question regarding the notion of truth. According to them, 
truth is a property and the expressions “… is true” and “it is true that …” 
are predicates. This point of view is shared by the proponents of many 
conceptions of truth. Some identify the property of truth with correspondence 
to reality; others see it as long-run utility in a broad sense or consistency of 
an extensive set of beliefs.
What leads to the acceptance of the view that truth is a property and 
the expressions “… is true” and “it is true that …” are predicates? It seems 
that the main reason is a belief that when we attach the word ‘true’ (or its 
derivates) to some sentence1 (or its name or description), we attribute to the 
latter some more or less abstract feature, namely being true. This feature 
amounts to, e.g., the sentence’s relation to a mind-independent reality, or 
its coherence with other sentences accepted as true.
This view seems to be confirmed by grammar. The phrase “… is true” in 
sentences like “the sentence ‘grass is green’ is true” or “Fermat’s last theorem 
1 We are aware of the tradition of recognizing the difference in meaning between the 
terms ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence.’ This difference is recognised in many ways in the 
literature. However, as we reject the existence of ideal entities called ‘propositions,’ so 
we do not use this word in the technical sense. Generally, we use the word ‘sentence’ 
to mark meaningful expressions; however, we do not exclude the possibility of the 
existence of sentences which lack meaning. In the latter case, we make it explicit. (It is 
worth noticing that the proposition/sentence difference does not appear in every European 
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is true” functions as a predicative expression. The same can be said of the 
phrase “it is true that …” in sentences like “it is true that snow is white” or 
“it is true that there are no elves.” From a grammatical point of view, truth 
expressions are predicates attributed to a subject anaphorically referred to 
by the pronoun ‘it.’ Hence, if we agree that standard grammatical analysis 
of these sentences gives us an accurate account of their logical form—at 
least in the respect being considered – then we must recognise the phrases 
“it is true that …” and “… is true” as predicates.
Obviously, many of the proponents of such an account of truth are 
aware of the exceptional nature of the “is true” predicate and the uniqueness 
of the property of being true. This is evident by the fact that, according to 
them, truth can be characterised by sentences which are substitutions of 
Tarski’s Convention T2. The equivalence “the sentence ‘April is the cruellest 
month’ is true iff April is the cruellest month” can serve as an example of 
such a substitution. According to the semantic theory of truth, the expression 
which attributes the property of truth to the sentence “April is the cruellest 
month” is logically equivalent to this sentence. So “is true” is quite an unusual 
predicate: It does not determine either any syntactic feature of sentences or, 
seemingly, their sense.3 In short, any sentence is what it is regardless of being 
true or false. However, on the other hand, when we find out which sentences 
are true and which are false, we gain real knowledge, the knowledge about 
the world. So, there is a vital difference between true and false sentences 
and it seems that the most natural way to express it is to say that truth and 
falsity are mutually exclusive properties of sentences.
Such intuitions as presented above lie at the core of the view that the 
expressions “it is true that …” and “… is true” are predicates, despite their 
being fundamentally different from other predicates. Certainly, some of these 
2 Such characterisation of this predicate requires either a list of all T-equivalences or 
a definition which results in all T-equivalences.
3 Intuitively, the sense of any sentence must be independent of its being true: We need 
to know what it means to be able to recognise whether it is true or false. Cf. Wittgenstein 
(1961: 4.061–4.064). This view can be rejected assuming that a class of models for a given 
language can be determined by ascribing logical values to sentences of the given language 
(still not interpreted). However, this solution is exposed to the following objection: Truth 
predicates (“… is true”, “… is false”) in their normal use can be attributed to meaningful 
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intuitions are right, but we believe that they do not entail the predicative 
character of truth expressions.
Strictly speaking, we do not propose a total rejection of the predicative 
theories of truth,4 because we can see neither a priori nor a posteriori 
reasons for the belief that the expressions “… is true” and “it is true that …” 
cannot serve as predicates on some occasions due to the will of language 
users. For certain needs, it can be useful to accept that, e.g., for a given 
formal symbolic system L with a given syntax, it is possible to define 
certain feature of syntactically acceptable formulas, which can be named, 
for instance, ‘model-related truth’ (or ‘model-related falsity,’ alternatively). 
The definition of the feature and the predicate related to it would belong to 
a wider symbolic system, ML.
Now we must make one remark concerning the concepts of formal 
semantics and meta-language. Philosophers who accept a model theory 
think that the semantics of a given language L can be described in its meta-
language, ML. ML enables us to define a model which is a structure consisting 
of a certain domain and a specific function by means of which a logical 
value can be assigned to every sentence of L. The meta-language may serve 
to represent the object language’s sentences and the reality described by 
those sentences. It is possible because the so-called semantic definition of 
truth contains a set of translation rules which enable the rendering of each 
primitive expression of L into ML. So, one can give a precise definition of 
truth for L in ML. However, such a definition of truth for L is—from the 
perspective of ML—in a sense, purely syntactic. All it really says in regard to 
any given sentence p belonging to L is that it has the property of being true 
iff a certain sentence π belonging to ML which is a translation of p is true. 
That π is true is, however, taken for granted in ML, and that is the reason to 
claim that Tarski’s definition is in some sense syntactic – the specification 
of true sentences of L is made by means of giving a list of true sentences 
of ML, and the sentences on the list play the role of axioms. The syntactic 
character of formal semantics has been noticed by the noblest critic of the 
whole idea of meta-languages, Ludwig Wittgenstein.5 Wittgenstein, in his 
later philosophy, emphasised that semantics cannot be derived from syntax. 
4 We apply the term “predicative theory” to any conception which treats expressions 
like “it is true that …” and “the sentence ‘…’ is true” as predicates.
5 Cf. Wittgenstein (1979a: 133).65 Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
Understanding language requires not only a competence in construction 
and transformation of expressions, but also a competence in using them in 
different language-games. “Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it 
life? —In use it is alive.”6 
II
There is a fundamental difficulty with the account of truth as the property 
referred to by the predicate “… is true.” It concerns how to understand 
T-equivalence. If the expression “… is true” is a predicate ascribed to 
sentences, then T-equivalences seem to be non-trivial, which is counter-
intuitive. Consider, for instance, the following equivalence:
1. The sentence “grass is green” is true iff grass is green.
That a certain object, namely the sentence “grass is green,” has a certain 
property (specifically, being true) neither follows from the fact that another 
object (grass) has another property (namely, being green), nor entails this fact. 
Some of the adherents of Tarski’s conception agree with that and accept the 
claim that T-equivalences are material. It seems, however, that Convention T 
imposes some additional constraints which prevent us from counting certain 
sentences as T-equivalences. Consider the following example:
2. The sentence “grass is green” is true iff Tarski emigrated to the USA.
This sounds absurd; therefore, we are forced to accept further constraints 
which will exclude merely material equivalences. The sentence on the right 
side of the equivalence must be a meta-linguistic translation of the sentence 
whose name occurs on the left side. Hence, according to the semantic 
definition of truth, the equivalence in 1 is non-trivial in itself, but only if 
such additional constraints are satisfied. 
However, the language users intuitively recognise 1 and other sentences 
of its kind as necessarily and unconditionally true. Moreover, it seems that 
they do it because of the form of such sentences, not because of some feature 
of their content. This simple fact has been omitted due to the misconception 
of the function of quotation marks, as has been pointed out by Peter Geach.7 
That some expression is mentioned does not exclude its being used at the 
6 Wittgenstein (1974: §432).
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same time. In contrast, we believe that mentioning an expression generally 
entails that it is being used.
This account of quotation marks can be proved by appeal to ordinary 
language intuitions. Note that we normally see no substantial difference 
(unless we consider superficial linguistic forms) between 1 and the following:
3. It is true that grass is green iff grass is green.8
According to Alfred Tarski, the logical form of 3 as an example of 
T-equivalence looks like this: “x is a true sentence iff p.”9 Such an account 
of the form, if it is not supplemented in some way, does not allow us to infer 
the right side from the left side and vice versa. The inference—as Tarski 
says—can be made provided that the definition of truth is given.
III
We believe that Tarski’s interpretation of the logical form of 3 (and other 
utterances containing the phrases “… is true” or “it is true that …”) presented 
above is wrong.10 There is another, much more accurate account of truth 
expressions. According to us, the logical role of phrases like “… is true” and 
“it is true that …” is operational – they should be understood as operators.
The notion of an operator can be explained in terms of the notion of 
operation. If a symbol of a base of an operation is removed from a complex 
symbol of a result of this operation, what is left is a symbol of an operator. 
(For instance, if the base of our operation consists of the sentential symbols 
‘p’ and ‘q,’ and the symbol of its result is ‘p & q,’ then the symbol ‘&’ is 
our operator.) We can explain the meaning of the two unary truth-operators 
using the following truth tables:11
8 Elizabeth Anscombe makes a similar remark. Cf. Anscombe (2000: 4).
9 Cf. Tarski (1983).
10 This belief has been uttered previously by Peter Geach: “The genuine significance of 
‘true’ is thus missed, and then queer theories and definitions of truth are framed.” Geach 
(1971: 96). 
11 Truth tables as complex symbols require further analysis. What is meant by ‘T’ and 
‘F’ used in the tables should be explained in particular. For the time being, we naively 
treat the tables as “semantic” definitions of logical connectives. We shall reject this 
assumption soon.67 Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
p ~ p p |– p
T F T T
F T F F
The first of them is certainly the well-known operator of logical 
negation which expresses the logical aspect of utterances like “it is not true 
that …” and “… is false.” The other is the assertion operator introduced 
to modern logic by Frege in his famous Begriffsschrift.12 According to the 
operational account, the logical form of 3 should be represented by the 
following formula: “|– p ≡ p.”13 It should be noted  that there is no need for 
any additional ‘definition of truth’ here, since we can infer the right side 
from the left side and vice versa by appealing only to the meaning of the 
assertion operator.
We cannot support our denial of predicative character of truth 
expressions by the authority of any classical philosopher. There are some 
traces of similar intuitions in the works of Frege and Wittgenstein, but even 
these two thinkers never clearly questioned the predicative account of truth. 
In more recent times, Dorothy Grover (and other prosententialists) and Robert 
Brandom explicitly rejected the latter view.14 However, we can point out 
12 Cf. Frege (1970: 11–12). It is worth mentioning that, according to Michael Dummett, 
the sign of assertion does not play the same role as the expression “it is true that …” One 
of his arguments is that when we utter conditionals like “if it is true that it is raining, then 
streets are wet,” we assert neither that it is raining nor that streets are wet. According 
to Dummett, only a content stroke can be recognised as a sentential operator (though 
not without qualifications), not a sign of assertion. Cf. Dummett (1973: 295–363). The 
opposite suggestion has been made by van Heijenoort. Cf. Heijenoort (1967: 440–446). 
However, the accuracy of our account of the logical form of the utterances “it is true that 
…” and “… is true” does not depend on who is right in this dispute. Our acceptance of 
Dummett’s interpretation would require a change in terminology only.
13 Dummett takes a different point of view: The sentence “it is true that grass is green” 
should be read as a statement which attributes truth to a certain thought. We refer to this 
thought by the utterance “that grass is green.” So, according to Dummett, this sentence 
should be analyzed in the following way: “it is true (that grass is green)”; the phrase 
“it is true” is a predicate and the phrase “that grass is green” is an individual constant. 
Cf. Dummett (2000: 10–11).
14 Grover is a co-author of the so-called prosentential theory of truth, according to which 
the phrase “… is true” is a semantically dependent part of the expression “it is true.” 
The latter is called a prosentence due to the analogy to pronouns and proverbs, and it 
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one otherwise famous thread in Kant’s thought which may be viewed as an 
astonishingly close parallel to our understanding of how the notion of truth 
works. Kant, arguing against the ontological proof, describes the function 
of the notion of being as follows:
Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that 
could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing (Position) 
of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. In the logical use 
it is merely the copula of a judgement.15
We believe that this description is generally correct: ‘being’ in its 
usual meaning cannot be taken as a real predicate. The same is correct in 
regard to ‘truth’ in its original and natural sense: it cannot be taken as a real 
predicate either. As attribution of existence to something says nothing about 
its character, so does the ascription of truth to a sentence says nothing about 
its syntax or content. 
As we noted before, the concept of truth can be given a predicative 
sense. The same thing can be done with the concept of being, since it is 
possible to divide names into two classes according to whether there are 
bearers of these names or not. We can, for instance, include names of 
existing animals (e.g., horses, cows, hens, boars, lions and elephants) to 
the first class and include names of nonexistent animals (e.g., dragons, 
hippogryphs, unicorns, dinosaurs and dodos) to the second class. Having 
done such a classification, we may be driven to the thought that being is 
a kind of feature of certain creatures. Nothing makes this thought wrong; 
however, its context – this classification of names—is quite unusual. What 
is particularly unusual here is the meaning of the word ‘feature’ in the 
sentence, “being is a kind of feature of certain creatures.” This use of the 
word ‘being,’ although odd, can be easily understood, but does not serve as 
a home for our old, familiar concept of being.
One must remember, of course, that there is a great dissimilarity 
between the two pairs of elements of language and reality we try to juxtapose, 
for a sentence is not a name and a fact is not an object. Therefore, being 
a modification of the prosententialists’ account. According to him, expressions like   
“… is true” serve as sentential operators. Cf. Brandom (1994: 299–305). The conception 
we defend in the present paper is very similar to Brandom’s account.
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should not be linked to facts represented by sentences, and truth should not 
be linked to what is referred to by a name or a definition. We recognise the 
importance of this categorial difference. However, many see even greater 
dissimilarity here: they say that truth is predicated to the linguistic entities 
(sentences) and being is attributed to the elements of extra-linguistic reality 
(things). Hence the two concepts are placed on different levels of language: 
the latter is recognised as belonging to the so-called object-language, and 
the former to its meta-language. We try to undermine this claim at the end 
of our paper.
IV
Our belief that expressions like “it is true that …” and “… is true” play, 
in principle, the role of an operator is, in the first place, supported by 
observations of their function (grammar)16 in ordinary language. To begin 
with the typical contexts of everyday life, in the cases when we replace 
ellipses by whole sentences, the latter form (e.g., “the sentence ‘he has lost 
his mind’ is true”) is much less frequent than the former one (e.g., “it is true 
that he has lost his mind”). Therefore, we assume that the phrase “it is true 
that …” is basic and the phrase “… is true” can be treated as a rarely used 
equivalent reserved for some special purposes (e.g., for meta-language). 
The fact that use of the truth expression “it is true that …” does not require 
putting a relevant sentence in quotation marks already suggests an operational 
interpretation of this expression:
4. (It is true that) p
But still, some may wonder whether the very existence of such expressions 
as “the sentence ‘grass is green’ is true” does not undermine the operational 
conception of truth. As we mentioned above, there is only a difference in 
style between the example just given and the utterance “it is true that grass 
is green.” Hence, according to our account, the phrase “the sentence ‘…’ 
is true” is an operator, too. The possibility of assigning truth to a foreign 
16 We use this notion after the later Wittgenstein; therefore, it should not be confused 
with the traditional concept of grammar. As we noticed before, according to traditional 
grammatical analysis, truth expressions work as predicates. Our turn towards non-
philosophical contexts does not mean that we take at face value a common sense view 
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language’s sentences does not undermine this solution. We have to assume 
only that the operator “the sentence ‘…’ is true” plays, in some contexts, an 
additional function: the result of its applying to foreign language sentences 
is the translation of these sentences into English; for instance, the effect of 
applying the operator “the sentence ‘…’ is true” to the German sentence 
“Der Schnee ist weiss” is logically equivalent to the following English 
expression: “it is true that snow is white”.
Another issue we must examine is the question: How should we 
analyze statements such as “All he said is true”? No sentences are used or 
mentioned in constructions of this type. We propose to render the structure 
of the statement by the following formula:
5. For every p (if X said p, then (it is true that) p).
We think that in case of such judgments, quantification is substitutional 
and, therefore, their acceptance does not commit us to the belief that there 
are some entities referred to by the sentences; for example, propositions 
conceived as some abstract and extralinguistic things. By the way, the 
conception of ontological commitment is exposed to serious objections.17
Note that the phrases “it is true that …” and “… is true”—as we consider 
their syntactic form—belong to the family of expressions: “it is possible that 
…,” “it is necessary that …” and, obviously, “it is not true that …” All these 
expressions are treated in logical calculus as operators. So, why should an 
exception be made for “it is true that …”? Of course, it should not.
The operational interpretation is, to some extent, consistent with the 
redundancy theory, but on the other hand, the operational reading of phrases 
like “it is not true that …” does not suggest they are redundant. On the 
contrary, their contribution to the meaning of a whole utterance is plainly 
obvious. Why? Because each time our use of negation is not pragmatically 
idle. We seem to move the action forward: We come to a different ‘truth-
possibility’18 which can be particularly spectacular in a context of other 
logical operators, especially quantifiers. 
17 First, the famous dictum, “to be is to be a value of a variable,” cannot be formulated 
in the canonical notation. Second, if we accept Frege’s assumption that being is not 
a property of individuals, then Quine is wrong: We can say that Julius Caesar is a value 
of a variable, but we cannot say that he exists. Cf. Geach (1968: 161–162).
18 This concept was used by the early Wittgenstein. Cf. Wittgenstein (1961: 4.3).71 Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
Assertion behaves differently. Logicians quickly lost their interest 
in the assertion operator due to its logical ‘redundancy.’19 It is evident 
that this operator does not change the logical value of its argument and its 
effectiveness is equal to the practical effectiveness of exponentiation with 
exponent 1, or multiplying by 1, or adding zero.20 On the other hand, the 
assertion operator is without a doubt the only expression of symbolical 
notation which to a large extent renders the sense of the phrase “it is true 
that …” It seems, then, that the acceptance of an operational reading of truth 
expressions entails the acceptance of ‘full blooded’ redundancy theory, for 
we can always dispense with an operator which does not change anything.
Here we have the answer to our question: Why, despite the syntactically 
suggested symmetry between the two expressions, namely “it is not true 
that …” and “it is true that …,” is the former easily read in the operational 
way and the latter is not? Our intuitive resistance to the idea that the proper 
logical sense of “it is true that …” is expressed by the assertion operator has 
the same source as our resistance to redundancy theory. It springs from the 
conviction that the phrase “it is true that …” (like the phrase “it is not true 
that …”) may function as a semantically relevant component of our discourse. 
This conviction was brilliantly described by Frege in his interesting, though 
not a very conclusive, remark regarding truth:
It is … worth noticing that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” 
has just the same content as the sentence “it is true that I smell the scent 
of violets.” So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by 
my ascribing to it the property of truth. And yet is it not a great result 
when the scientist after much hesitations and laborious researches can 
finally say “My conjecture is true”? The Bedeutung [meaning] of the 
word ‘true’ seems to be altogether sui generis.21 
Frege recalled two contexts (from many possible ones) in which we 
use the word ‘truth.’ The use of this word in the first context is rather queer 
19 A critique of the Fregean notion of assertion can be found in several places in the 
works of the early Wittgenstein, for instance in propositions 4.063 and 4.064 of the 
Tractatus.
20 Notice that all of these mathematical operations are not meaningless in the sense that 
they are forbidden (like division by zero). They are simply useless; they bring nothing 
to our calculations.
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due to the special grammar of first-person expressions of feelings. We can 
replace the Fregean example by the following pair of sentences: “the book 
lies on the table” and “it is true that the book lies on the table.” We gain 
absolutely nothing by preceding the first sentence with the phrase “it is true 
that …” though there is no grammatical prohibition – no rule embedded 
in our use of this expression – which would forbid us adding it to the first 
sentence. This observation seems to favor the redundancy theory.22
However, the second context mentioned by Frege seems to indicate 
that the redundancy theory is wrong, since it ignores situations in which the 
sense of the phrase “it is true that …” has an essential contribution to the 
sense of the whole. Note that the second Fregean example refers to a situation 
where a subject who formulates a conjuncture does not initially assign any 
definite logical value to it, for one does not yet know whether it is true or 
false. The knowledge has come after some time and it has been expressed 
by the words “My conjecture is true.”
We believe that both contexts mentioned by Frege can be read in an 
operational manner. It is rather obvious in regard to the first. The trouble 
with the second context is the supposition that there is a third logical value, 
which can drive us back to the predicative theory of truth. Therefore, we 
must take a look at non-classical systems. The fact that a logical value of 
a sentence is undetermined can be rendered in a symbolic system by an 
ascription of an intermediate value to the sentence; Łukasiewicz was guided 
by this idea when introducing his three-valued logic. But when you admit 
three-valued logic, nothing can stop you from admitting infinitely many 
logical values.23  In consequence, the logical value becomes a parameter 
and the truth (alternatively falsity) is understood just as a peculiar value of 
probability, namely 1 (alternatively 0); probability itself is understood as 
a concept more fundamental than truth, a measurable feature of sentences 
like weight or size of some objects. But such an interpretation trivialises both 
the concept of truth and the concept of probability. It seems that acceptance 
of many-valued systems entails intuitions which blur the uniqueness of the 
logical values.
22 Of course, provided that the sentence in question is part of non-anaphoric expression 
(if there are any), not part of a dialogue.
23 Cf. Woleński (1989: 119–128).73 Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
So far, we have examined merely syntactical clues which can support 
our operational reading of truth expressions. But there are much more 
fundamental pragmatic reasons for accepting this view. Let us start with 
the question concerning the genesis of the concepts of truth and falsity. 
Considering this difficult subject matter, we appeal to an interesting 
conception of Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre, in his Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?, convincingly argues that the question of whether any belief is 
true is preceded by an experience of falsity.24  Therefore, it can be said that 
the explicitly expressed concept of falsity is ‘older’ than the explicit concept 
of truth. Strictly speaking, the latter can be formed only on the model of 
the former – as its counterpart – to make an explicit expression of assertion 
possible, which was previously expressed only in an implicit way, namely, 
by uttering relevant indicative sentences.
The moment of emergence of the concept of falsity is extremely 
important for the analysis of sentences. Before this moment, sentences 
could have one of the following forms: Fx, xRy, or P(x1, x2, x3…), and so 
on.25 The expression of the experience of falsity consists in the extension 
of basic forms of indicative sentences – the extension enables us to say that 
a certain belief is false. Hence the forms have been enriched by the phrases 
equivalent to the English “it is false that …” The logical structure of the new 
forms contains the operator of negation, or, to be more precise, a place for 
an operator which is initially filled by the operator of negation, but which 
can be filled later by any unary operator. The new forms can be represented 
as follows: ψFx, ψxRy, etc., where ψ is an operator variable. The domain of 
the operator variable is a set of unary sentential operators.26
These considerations have led us to the point where we can explain 
more closely what is the source and the function of the assertion operator. Its 
possibility emerges with the possibility of negative sentences. The assertion 
operator can fill the place for negation and other unary sentential operators, 
24 Cf. MacIntyre (1988: 355–357).
25 These are, respectively sentential functions from which one can obtain, by making 
relevant substitutions, the following sentences: “Socrates is a man,” “Othello loves 
Desdemona,”  “Alfred needs a car in order to go from London to Brighton.” All arguments 
are italicised in these examples.
26 The idea of an operator variable came to Łukasiewicz’s mind before the second 
world war. Cf. Woleński (1989: 107–110). According to us, this variable, contrary to 
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such as “it is possible that …” and “it is necessary that …”, which enable 
us to express our affirmation of the content of indicative sentences. This 
way of affirmation is no longer ‘naïve’; it comes after the recognition of 
the possibility of denying any sentence. This possibility is inherent in the 
logical structure of a sentence extended by a place for an operator. Thus, from 
a pragmatic point of view, the vital use of the assertion operator does not 
consist in the transition from Fa to |–Fa, as this transition is pragmatically 
idle, but rather consists in replacing other operators in sentences of the 
form: ~Fa or ◊Fa. The most evident example of linguistic activity a couple 
of different unary sentential operators are used in is discussion – disputants 
can adopt different attitudes, expressed by the use of relevant operators, 
toward a certain view being considered.
We can see that although treating the expression “it is true that …” 
as an operator seems to deprive it of an important semantic function, it 
plays a significant role, should it be considered in the context of molecular 
sentences. It finds its natural place in dialogical situations where different 
attitudes toward the same content are adopted. These various attitudes are 
expressed by unary operators like assertion, negation, possibility, etc.
MacIntyre’s thesis that the experience of falsity is prior to the experience 
of truth and its extension, saying that the concept of truth was formed later 
than the concept of falsity, can provoke objections. It seems that assertion 
is more fundamental than negation, at least for a reason that any negative 
sentence is more complex than corresponding positive sentences—the former 
consists of a indicative sentence and the specific operator while the latter 
may be expressed without using any operators. We do not want to reject it. 
Moreover, the claim that the idea of assertion is implicitly inherent in the 
idea of an indicative sentence is the climax of our considerations. However, 
according to our belief, the formation of the explicit concept of truth has 
become possible after the formation of the explicit concept of falsity. There is 
no contradiction: use of the indicative mood implying assertion of a content 
does not require explicit assertion of a content.
V
If we assume that ‘|–’ is an abbreviation of “it is true that …,” then the 
following scheme expresses the right intuition underlying the Convention T:75 Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
6. |– p ≡ p 
The meaning of the assertion operator, as we mentioned before, can be 
explained by means of the following truth table:
p |– p
T T
F F
Look into this complex symbol for a moment. What, in fact, do its 
components stand for? Particularly, what is the meaning of the ‘T’ and 
‘F’ signs? We admit that the standard notation of truth tables can suggest 
that they refer to some special logical objects. However, the truth tables 
should be preferably treated as a kind of heuristic device, just as they were 
by Wittgenstein when he used them in defining logical connectives for the 
first time.27 We believe that the best way to understand the real content of 
truth tables is to translate them into a language which is closer to everyday 
speech. When we make such a translation, we get the explication of the 
meaning of a truth table for the assertion operator as follows: Any sentence 
p is true iff its assertion is true, and it is false iff its assertion is false. Now, 
this explication can be stated more systematically, namely:
7a. It is true that p iff it is true that |– p.
7b. It is not true that p iff it is not true that |– p.
These conditions can be transformed into the language of sentential calculus 
as follows:
8a. |– p  ≡  |– |– p
8b. ~ p  ≡  ~ |– p
Analogically the truth table for the ‘twin’ operator of negation can be 
explicated by the following formulas:
9a. |– p  ≡  ~ ~ p
9b. ~ p  ≡  |– ~ p 
This translation is possible only if we reject the idea that the expression, 
“… is true” predicated of sentences in a given language must belong to 
27 The early Wittgenstein considered several different ways of defining logical 
constants. The task can be done, for example, in terms of ‘ab p’ notation, presented 
in Notes on Logic, or by using the signs ‘T’ and ‘F.’ Cf. Wittgenstein (1979b: 102), 
Wittgenstein (1961: 4.443). The variety of possible notations supported his main idea, 
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its meta-language. While translating, we must be wary, because it is easy 
to forget that the expression which is on the right side of the sign of the 
equivalence must have a more complex logical form than that which is on 
the left side – this feature should be reflected by the notation. Any notation 
which is not perspicuous enough to exhibit this difference can be a source 
of semantic paradoxes.28 
What has been achieved in this way? We have translated the truth 
table, in which there are symbols seeming to stand for logical objects (as 
we know, Frege was misled by that appearance), into expressions containing 
sentential variables preceded by operators. Some may say we have a problem 
here, since our procedure of dispensing with truth tables, which are treated 
as semantic definitions of operators, has led to pairs of sentences which are 
not normal definitions – they do not enable any substitution of assertion 
and negation by other expressions. They are axioms characterizing how 
symbols ‘|–’ and ‘~’ function. If there is any operator preceding a sentence, 
the result of the operation of negation applied to the whole is the sentence 
preceded by the operator opposite the original one, whereas the operation of 
assertion applied to the whole does not result in the change of the operator. 
This syntactic feature suggests – to those who roughly understand unary 
logical operators—that truth is the designated value.29
What, however, does it mean that we understand these operators? It is 
a question of an interpretation of a symbolic system. As we pointed out, one 
can be deluded into thinking that one can interpret such a system only by 
means of its meta-language. In fact, as we argued, every meta-language is 
28  Our approach to this question is based on the following Wittgenstein’s claim: 
“No proposition can say anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot 
be contained in itself (that is the whole ‘theory of types’)”. Wittgenstein (1961: 3.332). 
The first part of this statement suggests that it applies only to predicates, but a similar 
argument concerning expressions containing sentential operators can be formulated as 
well. This argument can be used to dissolve semantic paradoxes. (Wittgenstein shows, 
in the next proposition of Tractatus, that Russell’s paradox can be dispensed of in this 
way.) We will return to this point in the appendix to our article.       
29 This thought can be presented by means of the following logical riddle: Assuming 
that f and g are unary extensional operators, and:
1) f ≠ g,
2) f p ≡ f f p,
3) g p ≡ g f p,
the question is: Which operator does f stand for? It is, of course, the assertion operator.77 Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
merely a translation of a relevant object language supplemented by rules 
associating primitive expressions of both languages—they are treated by 
adherents of formal semantics as rules of interpretation of an object language. 
A meta-language can give us what we want only if its interpretation is 
unproblematic, but there is no general reason to think that an understanding 
of an object language is more problematic than an understanding of its 
meta-language. Of course, some adherents of the idea of meta-languages do 
not admit it, but they do not present any reasonable arguments supporting 
their beliefs.
We can understand symbolic systems, such as sentential calculus, as an 
abstraction from natural language. The most important in that abstraction is 
a strict formulation of logical connections holding between sentences. But 
the very understanding of these connections, and hence the understanding 
of truth and falsity, relies on the understanding of a natural language 
possessed by competent users, no matter how inexplicit it is. Moreover, 
this understanding cannot be described from outside of any language. The 
concept of truth can be elucidated by examples which show how important 
true beliefs are for our life and how useful they can be. Imagine a hungry 
and determined buffalo hunter. If he believes that it is true that a big herd of 
buffalos is half a day’s journey west from the place where he is, he will set 
off west and continue his journey at least for half a day, but if he believes 
that this information is false, he will not leave his home unless he has other 
reasons for going west (or in some other direction).  Of course, the aim of 
our example is not to vindicate the so-called pragmatic definition of truth, 
for being true is obviously not the same as being useful. According to us, 
the concept of truth cannot be defined. We can only illustrate its use.
So, in what sense does the operational reading of truth expressions 
explain ‘the nature’ of truth? Only in the sense that it correctly explicates 
the syntactic structure of sentences having the following superficial forms: 
“it is true that p” and “the sentence ‘p’ is true.” It is obvious that it is not 
a definition of truth simpliciter, but only a partial elucidation of the concept.30 
As we already mentioned, the full explanation of the meaning of the assertion 
30 As Frege rightly emphasised, there are explanations which are not definitions, 
because what is logically simple and primitive cannot be defined, but only elucidated. 
This means that we can only give some hints or suggestions that will lead the reader to 
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operator cannot be based on its syntactic features alone31—it must, of course, 
appeal to the use of this sign within different language-games. It is also worth 
pointing out that the claim that the concept of truth is indefinable simpliciter 
is not a hallmark of the operational conception of truth expressions. For 
example, Tarski observed that although it is possible to define the word 
‘true’ for any given language (which satisfies certain conditions) in its meta-
language, this word cannot be defined, should it express the concept of truth 
not relativised to any particular language.32 
Indefinability of truth simpliciter (alternatively, falsity simpliciter) 
refers to the fundamental characteristic of any sentence, namely, to its being 
a “propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.”33 We cannot 
understand what the indicative mood is if we do not understand what truth 
and falsity are, and vice versa: We cannot understand what truth and falsity 
are if we do not understand what the indicative mood is.34 The meaning of 
indicative sentences is determined by the conditions in which they are true 
and the ones in which they are false. Thus, the dichotomy of truth and falsity 
is an intrinsic feature of any sentence. They are spanned between their truth 
possibilities. This was excellently formulated by Wittgenstein:
31 Dummett, in his article Truth, points out, appealing to an analogy with chess, that you 
cannot fully describe the language-games of assertion in only syntactical terms. As there 
is a fundamental difference between chess and a game having the same rules, but differing 
in that the winning consists in being check-mated; so there is a vital dissimilarity between 
our language-games and some language-games with the same grammatical rules but 
the opposite goals, namely uttering false sentences. We should add, however, that in the 
case of language, the second option seems to be difficult to imagine or even illusory. 
See Dummett (1978).    
32 Cf. Tarski (1983). The view that the concept of truth is not definable was accepted 
also by Frege and Davidson. Cf. Frege (1977), Davidson (1996).
33 Wittgenstein (1961: 3.12).
34 The late Wittgenstein expressed this in the following way: “And what a proposition 
is is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence formation (in English for example), 
and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game. And the use of the 
words ‘true’ and ‘false’ may be among the constituent parts of this game; and if so it 
belongs to our concept ‘proposition’ but does not ‘fit’ it.” Wittgenstein (1974: §136). 
Cora Diamond, analyzing Wittgenstein’s remarks on truth, also notices that there is 
a dependence between the concept of truth and the concept of sentence. Cf. Diamond 
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From this it results that ‘true’ and ‘false’ are not accidental properties of 
a proposition, such that, when it has meaning, we can say it is also true 
or false: on the contrary, to have meaning means to be true or false: the 
being true or false actually constitutes the relation of the proposition to 
reality, which we mean by saying that it has meaning (Sinn).35
Thus, truth and falsity are intrinsic and indefinable aspects of every 
meaningful indicative sentence36—Wittgenstein tried to exhibit this fact by 
the use of different notations, e.g. truth tables.37 These aspects are inseparable 
and cannot be detached from any sentence—it is not possible to ask about 
their nature without asking about the essence of sentence. However, they 
are not symmetrical, because every sentence has the claim to be true.38 
We formulated the content of this claim earlier in the following way: the 
idea of assertion is implicitly inherent in the idea of indicative sentences. The 
implicitly inherent idea of assertion precedes every operation of cancelling 
it. A sentence is not so much a line spanned between the poles of truth and 
falsity—to use a metaphor taken from Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic—but 
an arrow which points out one of these poles, namely truth.39
The equivalence of both columns of the truth table for the assertion 
operator shows that the operator does not bring into a language anything more 
than what is already contained in an indicative sentence. This statement can 
be interpreted twofold. It can mean that the concept of truth is superfluous. In 
our opinion such a thesis is unjustified. We believe that the assertion operator 
can be useful in explicating the claim to be true implied by any indicative 
sentence. It does not mean that there is such a property as being true (unless 
we construct a certain property and call it ‘truth’)—in our analyses of natural 
language sentences containing phrases like “it is true that …” and “… is 
35 Wittgenstein (1979c: 113). We do not change the traditional translation of the German 
word Satz in this and the following quotations from Wittgenstein.
36 We are aware that saying “truth and falsity are aspects of sentence” sounds like 
saying that they are properties, perhaps very special, but properties. So, is our treating 
the expression “it is true that …” as an operator—to use Diamond’s phrase—chickening 
out? We use this transitional way of speaking because we think that it can help to avoid 
deflationism, which is in a sense the other side of the correspondence theory of truth. 
37 See footnote 27.
38 Cf. Wittgenstein (1979c: 113).
39 “Names are points, propositions arrows—they have sense. The sense of a proposition 
is determined by the two poles, true and false.” Wittgenstein (1979b: 101–102). 80 Jakub Gomułka, Jan Wawrzyniak
true,” we try to show that the logical form and function of such expressions 
radically differs from that of predicates. Contrary to deflationists, however, 
we claim that the concept of truth plays a not only special, but also significant 
role in our language, and hence in our lives. Briefly speaking, the difference 
between deflationism and our conception consists in the fact that deflationists 
hold that the concept of truth can be in principle eliminated from all contexts, 
while we claim that this concept is indispensable in the language-games 
where we are free to question the natural, implicit claim of the sentences 
we use to be true.
Note that the concept of truth—despite a view which is widespread 
among philosophers and which is mentioned in section III—is not originally 
applied to sentences. This means it is not originally predicated of them, but 
connected with them. That is why it is used to speak about a reality described 
by a sentence, not about the sentence itself. So, there is a closer likeness 
between the concept of truth and the concept of being than we suggested 
earlier. Look at the following utterances: “something exists” and “it is true 
that thus and so.” The expression “thus and so” functions in this context 
analogously to the pronoun ‘something’: The former plays the role of an 
individual variable, the latter of a sentential variable. We replace the relevant 
variables with names and sentences, but the semantic values of names and 
sentences are, of course, extra-linguistic entities. When we say that there are 
dragons, we do not mean that there is the name ‘dragon,’ but that there are 
certain creatures. Similarly, when we say “It is true that the sun is shining 
today,” we do not mean that the subordinate sentence has a certain property, 
namely, a property of being true. What we mean is that some state of affairs 
obtains, namely, that the sun is shining today.
In brief, the words ‘truth’ and ‘true’ are used in order to point out 
that what we are speaking about is ultimately an extra-linguistic reality.40 
Moreover, it is possible to substitute in certain contexts the word ‘truth’ 
by the word ‘reality.’ We can say that the reality is such that there is a time 
for everything instead of saying that the truth is such that there is a time 
for everything. This does not mean that we should accept the medieval 
view that the concepts of truth and being are interchangeable,41 for such 
40 This view is accepted by, for example, Willard Van Orman Quine. See: Quine (1970).
41 A similar approach has recently been developed by adherents of the identity theory 
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a substitution is impossible in many contexts. The statement “the reality 
which surrounds us is full of useless things” is not only meaningful, but also 
true; on the other hand, it is difficult to assign any sense to the utterance: 
“the truth which surrounds us is full of useless things.” The significance of 
the concept of truth does not consist in its representing a kind of entity: an 
object, property or relation. A deeply rooted inclination tempts us to think 
that by rejecting the naming function of the word ‘truth,’ we deprive the 
word of any significance.42 In fact, we reject only an illusion concerning its 
function in language. Truth is neither something located in the world nor 
something to be found in mind or language. This illusory alternative leads 
to vehement disputes concerning the question of which kind of entity truth 
is. However, we think that the best way to determine the essence of truth is 
to look at the grammar (in the later Wittgenstein’s sense) of the expressions 
“it is true that …” and “… is true”. 
The operational interpretation of truth expressions shows what 
connection between truth and reality consists in. First, the fact that truth 
expressions are concatenated with sentences and not with their names 
explains why the subject of a statement assigning truth to a sentence is not 
the sentence itself, but what it speaks about. The use of the operator does 
not serve to assert something about the sentence which is the basis of the 
operation, but, at most, it can modify the content of the sentence. Second, 
according to our conception, there is a relation of mutual entailment between 
sentences of the form |– p and p. It is warranted by the truth table for the 
assertion operator. When we say it is true that there is a time for everything, 
we thereby assert something about reality, namely that there is a time for 
everything. (It sounds trivial, but it is doubtful whether it is possible to say 
something really original as far as this question is concerned.) In other 
words, if the fact that any sentence says that things are thus and so belongs 
to its essence, and if any sentence of the form |– p entails a sentence of the 
form p, then the sentence of the form |– p also says that things are thus and 
so. Therefore, our conception is not liable to the objection which we raised 
against a predicative reading of truth expressions, because it explicates 
42 The other reason for rejecting the operational interpretation of truth expressions 
may be the justified belief that it precludes formulation of a normal definition of truth 
for any language in which it is possible to construct infinitely many sentences. It seems, 
however, that this reason is insufficient, because the thesis that the concept of truth can 
be defined is not supported by undeniable arguments—it is rather a demand. 82 Jakub Gomułka, Jan Wawrzyniak
in a perspicuous way an intuitively accepted necessary character of the 
connection between the left and right side of equivalences such as our 
sentence 1.
Conclusion
The approach to the notion of truth presented above is not an alternative to 
the classical conception, if the latter is understood in the following way: “to 
say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true.”43 The main advantage of 
the operational reading is, in our opinion, that it represents in an adequate 
way how the expressions “it is true that …” and “… is true” work in 
everyday speech. Our conception confirms a widespread intuition that so-
called T-equivalences are not contingent truths, and shows why it is so. This 
enables us to avoid difficulties related to the belief that there is a peculiar 
and mysterious property, namely, being true. While rejecting the belief that 
truth is a property, we do not deny the significance of the concepts of truth 
and falsity. We indicate that the notions of truth and sentence are in a sense 
inseparable. You cannot explain what sentence is without an appeal to the 
concept of truth, nor can you explain what truth is without any reference 
to the concept of sentence or the notion of its content. It is worth noticing 
that we believe that the concept of falsity is, from a pragmatic point of 
view, even more significant than the concept of truth. Statements of the 
form “it is true that p” are not, from a pragmatic point of view, derivatives 
of utterances of the form “p,” but strictly connected to the sentences of the 
form “it is false that p.”
Appendix
It is a widespread opinion that the most important criterion for a test 
indicating whether a conception of truth is correct or not is its ability to 
eliminate the liar paradox. Tarski’s approach, which we have criticised, 
passes the test. Does our conception pass it, too? If not, then, even if it 
were in all other respects better than the predicative reading, it should be 
43 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII 7, 1011 b. Cf. Aristotle (1933: 201).83 Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
rejected. It can seem, at first sight, that our conception cannot deal with 
this antinomy. We believe, however, that irrespectively of which account 
of a logical form of truth expressions we adopt, the so-called liar sentence 
generates only an apparent problem. Moreover, the operational reading has an 
advantage because it enables one to notice almost immediately how difficult 
it is to assign any determinate meaning to the liar sentence. The real form of 
statements such as “the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true” is not the sentential 
function ‘P(x)’, in which ‘x’ should be substituted by a name of the sentence 
and ‘P(…)’ by the predicate “… is true,” but the sentential function ψp, in 
which ‘p’ should be substituted by the sentence and ‘ψ’ by the operator “it 
is true that …” A sentence containing the operator “it is true that …” or “it 
is false that …” must contain its base as well. And the base can contain the 
operator, too, but there must be a primitive, non-molecular sentence at last. 
If there were not, the sentence in question would be infinitely complex.
The parallel conclusion from the predicative standpoint is not obvious 
at first blush. If the names of sentences, and not the sentences themselves, 
appear in statements assigning truth or falsity to those sentences, then the 
belief that the ultimate objects of our statements must be sentences which 
do not contain semantic predicates requires an additional justification.44 
Our conception easily explains the intuition that the ultimate objects of our 
statements must be sentences which do not contain semantic terms. Apply 
the above observations to the following string of words:
11.  “11 is false.”
How should we read this utterance? If we appeal to the operational reading 
of truth expressions, we will get the infinite series:
12.  “It is false that it is false that it is false that …”
44 This belief, however, is rarely supported by an independent argument. It is often 
justified by observing that its rejection leads to the liar paradox. Adherents of a predicative 
reading put forward different proposals for avoiding this antinomy. Tarski’s classical 
solution assumes that utterances of everyday language—if they have any definite meaning 
at all – do not belong to one language, but to a hierarchy of languages of which the lowest 
element is a language lacking semantic terms. Another proposal was advanced by Saul 
Kripke. See: Kripke (1975). Kripke’s conception is based on the postulate of groundness 
– the postulate which is in a sense a counterpart of the belief that the ultimate objects 
of our statements must be sentences which do not contain semantic predicates. Kripke 
appeals to this requirement because he believes that it is in accordance with our intuitions. 84 Jakub Gomułka, Jan Wawrzyniak
Our conception requires the substitution of the symbol ‘11’ by the sentence 11. 
(According to the standard approach it should be substituted by the sentence 
11 enclosed by quotation-marks, but it does not matter whether we accept 
the standard conception at this point, because the expression, “the sentence 
‘…’ is false”—from the point of view of an operational reading – plays 
the same role as the expression “it is false that …” —namely, the role of 
an operator. What we do need to reject is the claim that a sentence put into 
quotation marks must be its own name. The fixation of the logical form of 
the liar sentence cannot be finished, because each occurrence of the symbol 
‘11’ must be substituted by the sentence “11 is false,” which contains this 
very symbol. No sentence, however, can have an infinitely complex logical 
form, so – if we try to interpret it in the most natural way – we cannot assign 
any logical form to it. Taking into account that no definite meaning is given 
to sentences no logical form is assigned to, it has to be admitted that, despite 
appearances, no definite sense is given to the liar sentence. 
It is worth noticing that the liar sentence raises a merely apparent 
difficulty for adherents of predicative conceptions as well. The sentence 
seems to be obtained by a substitution of the formula X(p), in which ‘X( )’ is 
a variable with a domain of unary predicates and ‘p’ is a sentential variable. 
‘X( )’ is substituted by the predicate “… is false,” but what should be inserted 
in the place of ‘p’? The liar sentence, of course. This step, however, does not 
stop the process of the analysis of the liar sentence’s logical form, because, 
as we assumed, the sentence just inserted seems to have the form X(p), 
so it turns out that the liar sentence has the form X(X(p)). Thus, relevant 
expressions must be put again in place of the variables—the result of this 
substitution is a sentence of the form X(X(X(p))). The procedure can never 
end; it drives us, of course, to an infinite regress.
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